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31 August 1966

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E  
R E L A T I N G T O N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y

**State Department review completed**

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
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### \*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Political Developments in South Vietnam: Pre-election activity continues throughout the country.


The Viet Cong Liberation Radio has carried an increasingly high volume of commentaries attacking the forthcoming constitutional assembly elections. Nearly half of its broadcast time of the past five days has been devoted to such diatribes.

Incidents of terrorism by the Viet Cong remain generally scattered with no appreciable rise in the number of such acts since the beginning of the election campaign on 26 August. Yesterday, the Viet Cong blew up a Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) barracks about 40 miles northwest of Saigon, wounding several Viet Cong defectors. There were no fatalities reported. (See Map)

Apparently there has been little public enthusiasm over the elections in Saigon. Public events staged by candidates have been sparsely attended. The government reportedly has canceled the use of its broadcasting facilities by candidates because the first speakers allegedly were critical of the regime.

Military Situation in South Vietnam: No contact with enemy forces was reported yesterday in any of the allied operations currently under way throughout the country.

Two US Marine operations ended yesterday in the northern I Corps area. Operation ALLEGHENY, about 15 miles southwest of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province, resulted in 113 Communists killed and



many huts, caves, tunnels, and quantities of equipment destroyed. Three Viet Cong were reported killed by four-day Operation JACKSON, in Quang Ngai Province about 10 miles south of Chu Lai. American casualties in the two operations totaled seven killed and 60 wounded. (See Map)

North Vietnamese Military Developments:

Preliminary pilot reports indicate that US aircraft from the carrier Constellation attacked and left burning a North Vietnamese PT boat shortly after midnight on 31 August (Vietnam time). The incident took place some 50 miles east of Haiphong in an area spotted with numerous islands. If confirmation is received, this would be the third North Vietnamese naval vessel put out of action by US aircraft in the past week. (See Map)

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A second PT boat attacked in the area at the same time appeared to suffer little damage.


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


### SS-N-2 CRUISE MISSILE

Length: 24 feet  
Diameter: 1.95 feet  
Wingspan: 7 feet  
No. of tail fins: 3  
Propulsion: Self-enclosed liquid-fuel rocket engine, with solid-fuel booster  
Speed: From subsonic up to Mach 1  
Altitude: Probably under 1,000 feet  
Maximum range: 20 nautical miles\*

Optimum range: 13 nautical miles  
Warhead: 1,000-2,000 pounds of high explosive  
Guidance: Preset inertial flight regime with terminal active radar homing  
Reliability: 60-70 percent probability of hitting target (under normal conditions)


\*The maximum range at which the SQUARE TIE target acquisition radar can distinguish a light cruiser.



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### OSA-CLASS MISSILE BOAT



EENDURANCE SPEED: ABOUT 1,000 NAUTICAL MILES (AT 15 KNOTS).  
DISPLACEMENT: 160 TONS  
LENGTH: 120 FEET  
BEAM: 26.5 FEET  
DRAFT: 5 FEET

MISSILE ARMAMENT: 4 CRUISE-MISSILE LAUNCHERS, NO RELOADS  
GUN ARMAMENT: 2 TWIN 37-MM. AA GUN MOUNTS  
RADAR: SQUARE TIE RADAR ON MAST  
PROPELLION: DIESEL ENGINES  
MAXIMUM SPEED: 40 KNOTS

Note: Photographs are of Russian equipment.

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\*Communist China: Two Chinese OSA-class guided-missile patrol boats have recently been detected for the first time in South China waters.

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The boats were operating in consort with two unidentified smaller vessels in the sea approaches to the Pearl River estuary just south of Canton. (See Map)

The OSAs may have been built in South China shipyards, or recently deployed from northern China waters by way of the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese previously had been credited with only one boat of this type, which was first identified off East China in July 1964.

The OSA is a large patrol boat of Soviet design, approximately 120 feet in length. Powered by three diesel engines, it can reach speeds up to 40 knots. It carries four single surface-to-surface missile launchers believed to fire the SS-N-2 guided missile, which has a high-explosive warhead and a range of about 15 nautical miles. (See Photographs)

The appearance of these vessels underscores Peking's efforts over the past year or so to augment its southern fleet.

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NATO: [The Germans are floating a plan to break the deadlock between the Fourteen Allies and the French over the future mission of French forces in Germany.]

[State Secretary Carstens has told Ambassador McGhee that the German Foreign Office is considering a plan calling for negotiations on the problem between General Lemnitzer and General Ailleret. Although Carstens emphasized that the plan had not yet been approved by Foreign Minister Schroeder, McGhee thinks the Germans may have been sending up a trial balloon.]

[The German plan, while differing superficially from that of the French, would in fact move the Fourteen very close to the French position, which maintains that the issue should be settled by talks at the level the Germans are considering. The Allies, however, hold that the NATO foreign ministers' resolution already agreed upon requires political agreement in the North Atlantic Council before the generals can begin their talks.]

[The negotiations on this issue in the Council have been recessed since 27 July. Failure to reach an agreement when they resume in September will result in the matter being passed to the NATO foreign ministers.]

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Laos: [Souvanna Phouma's government faces a vote of confidence in the National Assembly today.]

[Souvanna precipitated the vote by telling the assembly members that they were uneducated and incapable of managing the affairs of state.]

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[Military leaders, however, are bringing pressure on individual assembly members to support the government.]

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[King Savang has also been urging restraint on disgruntled assembly leaders. The King, who has been taking an increasingly active role in political affairs, has argued forcefully that Laos cannot afford another period of political instability.]

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[The King will probably dissolve the assembly and call for new elections if the vote goes against Souvanna.]

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Dominican Republic: President Balaguer has given no firm indication that he intends to ask for a delay in the departure of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).

The US Embassy in Santo Domingo believes Balaguer would welcome an extension of the IAPF's presence--now slated to end in late September--if he did not have to bear the political onus of requesting it. In the embassy's opinion, the President is not now able to justify such a request to the public and would be vulnerable to attacks by left- and right-wing nationalists if he asked for an extension.

Nevertheless, Balaguer recently said that retention of even a single IAPF soldier would serve as an important psychological prop for his regime and he has stressed that key military changes must be accomplished before the IAPF withdraws. The President may seize on some incident, on threatened political agitation, or on military reluctance to accept his reform proposals, as justification for delaying the departure.

If the IAPF does leave, the embassy believes there will be tension characterized by a rise in terrorism and by resentment among right-wing elements affected by Balaguer's proposed military reforms. In the embassy's view, Balaguer will be able to ride this out.

The outlook over the ensuing months may be less promising, since the government has not developed a strong political base. [redacted]

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